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INFORMATION-SEEKING D IALOGUES*  
PAULO QUARESMA AND JOSE GABRIEL LOPES 
~> We propose a framework that supports the recognition of plans and in- 
tentions behind speech acts through abductive inferences over discourse 
sentences. These inferences allow each agent to have an active and intelli- 
gent participation in dialogues, namely, in cooperative information-seeking 
dialogues. In our framework, the possible actions, events, states, and world 
knowledge are represented by extended logic programs (LP with explicit .... 
negation), and the abductive inference porcess is modeled by the frame- 
work proposed by Pereira et al. [13], which is based on the Well Founded 
Semantics augmented with explicit negation (WFSX) and contradiction re- 
moval semantics (CRSX). It will be shown how this framework supports 
abductive planning with Event Calculus [5], and some examples will be 
shown [10, 14] in the domain of information-seeking dialogues. Finally, 
some open problems will be pointed out. <1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A robust man-machine interaction requires the capability for inferring the beliefs, 
intentions, and plans of each active agent. In order to deal with these problems, 
there has been a lot of work done taking different views and approaches. One major 
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approach follows the classical planning scheme developed in the STRIPS [6] and 
NOAH [18] model. In this model, each plan is defined as a sequence of actions, 
and each action is composed by a head, preconditions, constraints, effects, and 
subactions. The inference of plans (a list of user actions) is achieved by using a 
library of plans and actions, some heuristic rules, and the user possible goals. This 
approach as been used by Litman and Allen [10, 9] in order to infer plans behind 
speech acts in dialogues. A different approach was followed by Pollack [14, 2] which 
models plans as mental states and tries to abduce the mental attitudes behind each 
speech act. 
We propose a general extended logic programming framework which will allow 
us to handle both models and to deal with the same kind of dialogues that are dealt 
with in their approaches. The basic point is that the inference of plans, intentions, 
and beliefs supporting speech acts during dialogues is a nonmonotonic process. For 
instance, in the following dialogue (from the train station domain), the clerk needs 
to revise his beliefs about the passenger intentions (after the passenger's second 
utterance). 
• Passenger: The eight-fifty train? 
• Clerk: Eight-fifty to Porto? Gate Seven. 
• Passenger: No, the eight-fifty from Porto. 
• Clerk: Oh, it will arrive about ten minutes late at gate five! 
• Passenger: Ok. 
Since we need, as the basic inference process, nonmonotonic reasoning, we have 
used the event calculus to represent events, time, and actions and a logic program- 
ming framework--Well Founded Semantics of eXtended Logic Programs (WFSX) 
augmented with Contradiction Removal Semantics (CRSX)--from the work by 
Pereira et al. [13]. This framework has a given and defined semantics and ex- 
tends logic programming. It enables one to model several kinds of nonmonotonic 
reasoning, namely, default, abductive, and hypothetical reasoning. 
In Section 2, a description of the extended logic programming framework show- 
ing how nonmonotonic reasoning is dealt with is given. In Section 3, the process 
of abductive planning with event calculus is described. Section 4 describes the lan- 
guage that was used to represent actions (from Gelfond and Lifschitz [7]). Section 5 
describes the epistemic operators used to model the different attitudes. In Section 
6, the speech acts necessary to handle dialogues are described, and in Section 7, the 
rules that define the agents' behavior are described. In Section 8, it is shown how 
this framework is able to handle some classical problems in dialogue understanding: 
lack of information in the utterances, and wrong user plans. Finally, in Section 9, 
some open problems and future work will be pointed out. 
2. EXTENDED LOGIC  PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK 
As was pointed out in Section 1, we need nonmonotonic reasoning in order to reason 
about plans and attitudes, and we have to model actions, events, states, and world 
knowledge. In this framework, they are modeled by extended logic programs which 
are sets of normal and integrity rules having the form 
• H +- B1 , . . . ,Bn ,  not 6'],. . . ,  not Cm(m >_ O,n >_ O) 
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where H,  B1 , . . . ,  Bn, C1, C,~are classical iterals. A classical iteral is either an 
atom A or its explicit negation ~A. not stands for the negation as failure (NAF). 
In integrity rules, H is the symbol ± (contradiction). 
Programs with integrity constraints and explicit negation may be contradic- 
tory. For instance, in the following program P = {a *-- not b, 1--- a} (from [13]), 
not b is true by Closed World Assumption and, by the second rule, we have a 
contradiction. 
The framework proposed by Pereira et al. removes the contradiction by 
adding to the original program the complements of some revisables. In the previous 
example, it would add a rule to prevent he CWA over the first rule. The minimal 
set of revising assumptions of a program P is calculated through the use of an 
iterative algorithm. It was shown that this algorithm is sound and complete for a 
finite set of revisables. 
The framework described allows the modeling of different types of non- 
monotonic reasoning, namely, default, hypothetical, and abductive reasoning. Non- 
monotonic reasoning is fundamental for the inference of plans and intentions in 
dialogues, as will be shown in Section 8. 
• Default reasoning can be modeled, adding to the program rules of the form 
Normally A(X) implies B(X) 
which can be written as 
1. B(X) ~-- A(X), not ab(X) 
which states that if it is not possible to prove the abnormality of X, then B 
should hold. 
• With a slight change, it is possible to handle hypothetical reasoning: 
Quakers may or may not be pacifists 
which can be written as 
1. pacifist(X) ~-- quaker(X), hypqp(X) 
2. hypqp(X) ~- not ~ bypqp(X) 
3. ~ hypqp(X) *-- not hypqp(X) 
which states the Quakers are pacifists if it is not possible to prove (by NAF) 
explicitly that they are not (and vice versa). 
• Abductive reasoning is modeled with the rules 
F might be true (or not) 
which can be written as 
1. F ~--not ~F  
2. ~F  ~-not F 
which state that if it is not possible to prove -~F, then F should hold (and 
vice versa). 
Using this approach, it is possible to create an abductive program from 
an abductive theory (P, Ab) by adding to the program P for all literals L in 
the abducible list Ab two rules of the form 
1. L ~-not ~L 
2. -~L ~--not L. 
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In the domain of dialogues, we will allow events to be abduced. This 
process is done through the use of this framework and the Event Calculus. 
3. ABDUCTIVE  PLANNING WITH EVENT CALCULUS 
In order to represent and reason about actions and events, we use the event calculus 
with some changes proposed by Eshgi [5] and Missiaen [12]. 
In this formalism, events are action instances and have no duration. They can be 
represented by the time point at which they occurred, and time points are ordered 
by the precedence r lationship <. Events are related to its actions by the predicate 
act(E, A). happens(E) states that the event E occurs, initiates(E, P) means that 
the event E initiates the property P, and terminates(E, P) states that property 
P is terminated by the event E. succeeds(E) means that the event E can happen, 
i.e., its preconditions are satisfied (different from happens, which means that the 
event really happened), holds_at(P, T) means that property P holds at time T. 
A plan consists of the set of facts defined by the predicates <, happens, and act. 
This set can represent a plan because it defines the events that happen, the actions 
that are associated with those events, and the time ordering between the events. 
There are some properties about plans that can be defined, namely: 
A plan is partial if there is a partial ordering between the time points of the plan. 
It is linear if its time points are totMly ordered. A total plan is a linearization of a 
given plan that satisfies the partial order of that plan. 
A plan P is a solution for a goal G wrt the theory T if 
1. There exists a substitution a such that T ÷ P F- a(G), where ÷ states the 
union of sets. 
2. Every event of P succeeds, i.e., 
V~happens(ei) c P, T + P t- succeeds(ei). 
Finally, a plan is valid if, for every variable substitution for which the plan is 
a solution, the linearizations of the plan are also solutions (for the same variable 
substitution). 
The following logic program is proposed by Missiaen in order to describe what 
properties hold at a given time: 
holds_at( P, T) ~- happens( E), initiates( E, P), 
succeeds(E), E < T, persists(E, P, T). (1) 
persists(E, P, T) ~-- not clipped(E, P, T). (2) 
clipped( E, P, T) ~-- happens( C), terminates( C, P), (3) 
succeeds(C), not out(C, E, P ). 
out(C,E,T) *-- (T=G;T < C;C < E). (4) 
which states that the property P holds at time T if there was an event that occurred 
before T, if that event initiates P and if P persists until T. A property P persists 
until T if it is not possible to prove (by NAF) the existence of an event that 
terminates the property P before T. Note the importance of the predicate succeeds 
(E) forcing the preconditions of the event E to be satisfied. 
ABDUCTION OF PLANS IN DIALOGUES 107 
This logic program is different from the one proposed by Shanahan [19] because, 
in Shanahan's work, if C cannot be proved to be inside [E, T[, then it is assumed 
to be outside, while in Missien's work, if C cannot be proved to be outside the 
interval, then it is assumed to be inside. This implies that the programs have 
different completions when there is a partial order between the events. If the events 
have a total order between them, then the two programs are equivalent. 
We have chosen the Missien proposal because, in this approach, every solution 
plan is a valid one, i.e., all of its linearizations are correct, while in Shanahan's 
approach, it is not guaranteed that every solution plan is valid. 
However, it is still an open problem to prove that this approach is correct, 
complete, and/or sound wrt the well founded semantics framework described in the 
previous ection. 
As was pointed out earlier, in order to infer a user's plan, it is necessary to find 
the plans that satisfy the following implication: 
• T+Pe ~(C). 
In this approach, planning can be seen as an abductive process in which the set 
of abducible predicates i composed of 
AD = {happens/I, act/2, </2}. 
This set of abducibles allows the framework to abduce events (related with 
actions) and their temporal relations. 
4. REPRESENTING ACT IONS 
In order to represent actions, we have used the language proposed by Gelfond and 
Lifschitz [7]. In this language, actions can be represented by the following two 
propositions: 
A causes F i f  P1, . . . ,Pn 
F after A : , . . . ,An .  
The first rule means that action A causes the effect F if the preconditions 
P:, • • -, Pn hold, and the second rule states that the fluent F will hold as a conse- 
quence of the sequence of actions A : , . . . ,  An. 
In this work, we are only using the first rule, but we allow rules without actions 
(F  if P1, . . - ,  Pn) and actions without consequences (A if P1,-- . ,  P~)- 
We have defined a translation mechanism from this language into the event cal- 
culus language introduced earlier. For each action described by the first statement, 
the following two rules are obtained: 
succeeds(E) ~- act(E,A),holds_at(P1,E),.. . ,holds_at(Pn, E). 
initiates( E, F) ~- act( E, A ), holds_at( P:, E), . . . , holds_at( P~, E). 
This scheme states that an event E associated with an action A at a time E 
is possible if the preconditions hold at that time, and as a consequence of the 
event, the property F will hold in the future. Note that the preconditions axe also 
verified in the second rule because action A can have different effects when different 
conditions hold. For example, shooting a gun causes damages only if the gun is 
loaded. 
108 P. QUARESMA AND J. G. LOPES 
If the action has no direct effects, the rule can be written as 
A i f  P1, . . . ,Pn 
and translated into 
succeeds(E) ~-- act(E, A ), holds_at(P1, E), . . . , holds_at( Pn, E). 
If we want to define a rule which relates only fluents, we can write the following 
rule: 
F i f  P l , . . . , Pn  
which will be translated into 
holds_at(F, E) ~ holds_at(P1, E), . . . , holds_at( P~, E). 
Note that the operator if is overloaded in the situations F if P1,.- •, P~ and A if 
P1 , . . . ,  P~. This is not a problem, and it can be solved because the left operands 
are different in the two stated eases. 
On the other hand, it is very important o point out that we have not proved 
that the proposed transformations into the abductive vent calculus are correct and 
complete. 
In order to apply the described framework to a specific domain, we have to 
translate the domain specific rules defined using this language into extended logical 
rules. For instance, the blocks world action 
move_to_top_of(X,Y) causes on(X,Y)  i f  on_hand(X),free(Y). 
is translated into the rules 
succeeds(E) *-- act( E, move_to_top_o f ( X, Y) ), 
holds_at(on_hand(X, Y), E), holds_at(free(Y), E). 
initiates(E, on(X,Y))  ~ act(E, move_to_top_of(X, Y)), 
holds_at(on_hand(X, Y), E), holds_at(free(Y), E). 
5. EP ISTEMIC  OPERATORS 
As epistemic operators needed to describe the agents' mental state, we have defined 
the following [2, 4]: 
1. int(a,~): agent a wants action ~ to be done 
2. bel(a,p): agent a believes that p is currently true 
3. ach(a,p): agent a believes p will be true as a consequence of the actions of 
some agent (including its own actions) 
4. exp(a,p) ~- bet(a,p) or ach(a,p): agent a expects the fluent p to be or to 
become true. 
More complex actions can be constructed from the operators to and by: 
1. to(c~,p): the plan of performing ~ in order to make p true 
2. by(c~, t3,p): the plan of making ~3 by doing ~, while p is true 
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For example, the inform act 
• I can't open the door. 
could be a step of the plan to request he hearer to open the door: 
by(inform(s, h, cantdo( s, open_door(s))), request(s, h, open_door(h)), 
ach( s, door_opened)). 
And this request could be a step of the complex action 
to(request(s, h open_door(h)), door_opened). 
It was also necessary to define some rules that connect hese epistemic operators: 
int(A, to(a,P)) i f  bel(A, to(a,P)) 
int(A, a), 
ach(A, P). 
This rule means that if an agent A believes that by doing aP will become true, 
and A intends to do a and A wants P to become true, then A intends to do a in 
order to make P true. 
There is also the corresponding rule for the relation by: 
int(A, by(a,~,P)) i f  bel(A, by(a,/3, P)), 
int(A, a), 
int(A, ~), 
exp( A, P ). 
This rule means that if an agent A believes that by doing aft is done while P is 
true, and A intends to do a and t3 and A expects P to be true, then he intends to 
do a in order to have ~ done while P is true. 
These rules are translated into the following logical rules: 
hol ds_at (int ( A, to(a, P)), E) ~- hol ds_at (bel ( A, to(a, P ) ) , E ) , 
holds_at( int( A, a ), E), (5) 
holds_at(ach(A, P), E). 
hotds_at( int( A, by(a, ~, P) ), E) ~ holds_at(bel( A, by(a, ~, P) ), E), 
holds_at( int( A, ~ ), E), 
hol ds_at (int ( A, [3 ) , E ) , (6) 
holds_at( exp( A, P), E). 
Also needed is an integrity constraint, showing the inconsistency between bel and 
ach: 
_1_ *- bel(A,P),ach(A,P). (7) 
In fact, it is impossible to believe that P is true and simultaneously to wish P to 
become true. 
Finally, we have two more rules: 
beI(A, int(A,a)) i f  int(A,a) 
bet(A, bel(A,P)) i f  bel(A,P). 
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These rules mean that an agent believes in his intentions and beliefs. They are 
translated into 
holds_at(bel(A, int(A,a)), E) *-- holds_at(int(A, a), E). (8) 
holds_at(bel(A, bel(A, P)),E) ~- holds_at(bel(A, P), E). (9) 
6. SPEECH ACTS 
Using the language described in the previous ection we have defined expressions 
for some speech acts (from [1]): 
1. inform(s, h,p): s informs h about the proposition p
2. informref (s, h, t,p): s informs h about the term t of the proposition p
3. request(s, h,a): s requests h to do action a. 
The first action is described by 
inform(s,h,p) causes bel(h, bel(s,p)) 
i f  bel(s,p) 
bel( s, int( s, inform(s, h, p) ) ). 
If a speaker believes in a specific proposition and intends to inform the hearer 
about that proposition, then the hearer will believe that the speaker believes it. 
This rule models a naive behavior where the agents only inform propositions in 
which they believe. 
The translation into logical rules is 
succeeds(E) ~-- act( E, in form( S, H, P) ), 
holds_at(bel( S,P), E) (10) 
holds_at( bel( S, int( S, 
inform(S, H, P))), E). 
initiates(E, bel(H, bel(S,P))) ~ act(E, inform(S,H,P)), 
holds_at(bel( S,P), E) 
holds_at( bel ( S, int ( S, (11) 
inform(S, H, P))), E). 
The second action is defined by 
informref(s,h,t,p) causes bel(h, bel(s, ref(t,p))) 
i f  bel(s, ref(t,p)) 
bel( s, Jut(s, in f ormre f ( s, h, t, p). 
If a speaker believes t is a feature value pair of p and the speaker intends to inform 
the hearer about that property, then the hearer will believe that the speaker believes 
that t is a property of p. The logical rules are 
succeeds(E) ~-- act(E, informref(S, H, T, P)), 
holds_at(bel(S, ref(T, P)), E) (12) 
holds_at(bel( S,int( S, 
informref(S, H, T, P))), E). 
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initiates(E, bel(H, bel(S, ref(T, P))) ~-- act(E, informref(S, H, T, P)), 
holds_at( belC S, ref (T, P) ), E) 
holds_at(bel( S,int( S, (13) 
informref(S, H, T, P))), E). 
The third speech act can be defined by 
request(s,h,a) causes belch ,bel(s,intCs ,a))) 
if  bel(s, cando(h, a)) 
bel( s, int( s, request(s, h, a ) ) ). 
If a speaker S believes a hearer H can do an action A, and the speaker believes 
that he wants to request he hearer to do the action, then he may actually do the 
request. 
Note that the request for an action has the same informational effects as a desire. 
For example, the sentences 
• Can you open the door? 
• I want you to open the door. 
will have as an effect the following proposition: 
bel( H, bel( S, int( S, openC H , door)))). 
The request expression is translated into 
succeeds(E) ~- act(E, request(S,H,A)), 
holds_at(bel( S,cando( H, A ) ), E) (14) 
holds_at(bel( S,int( S, 
request(S, H, A ) ) ), E). 
initiates(E, bel(H, bel(S, int(S, A))) ~-- act(E, request(S, H, A)), 
holds_at(bel(S, cando(H, A)), E) (15) 
holds_at(bel( S,int( S, 
request(S, H, A) ) ), E). 
7. AGENTS '  MENTAL  STATES 
We have defined two rules that define the mental states of the different agents that 
participate in the dialogues. 
The first rule defines the degree of cooperativeness of a dialogue: 
belch ,int(h,a)) if bel(h, belCs ,int(s,a)), 
bel( h, candoC h, a) ). 
This means that if an agent h believes that the agent s wants action a to be 
performed and h believes he can do that action, then he will believe he intends to 
perform it. The dialogues are totally cooperative. 
The rule is translated into 
holds_at(belCH, int(H,A)),E) ~-- holds_atCbel(H, candoCH, A)),E) (16) 
holds_at(bel( H, belC S, int( S, A))), E). 
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The second rule defines how an agent can be convinced by the other agents: 
bel(h,p) i f  bel(h, bel(s,p)). 
This rule means that the agent h believes in everything that he believes that the 
other agent believes. This approach is also a simplification of the reality and, in 
a more complex system, the agent would not believe in a proposition without first 
checking it. 
The rule is translated into 
hotds_at(bel(H, P), E) ~-- holds_at(bel(H, bel(-S, P)), E). (17) 
8, EXAMPLES 
In the following subsections, ome examples olved and implemented in a prototype 
developed at the Artificial Intelligence Center of UNINOVA will be presented. 
The first example is a dialogue in the train station domain where there is missing 
information in the passenger utterances. The clerk has to infer the intentions and 
the plans behind the passenger utterances. 
In the second example, it will be pointed out how to solve dialogue situations 
where incorrect knowledge is assumed by the speaker. The other agent needs to 
infer what are the speaker beliefs that do not hold, and it has to infer the correct 
plan to achieve the desired goals. 
8.1. Train Dialogue 
Consider the example presented in Section 1 (adapted from [10]): 
• Passenger: The eight-fifty train? 
- Clerk: Eight-fifty to Porto? Gate Seven. 
~• Passenger: No, the eight-fifty from Porto. 
• Clerk: Oh, it will arrive about ten minutes late at gate five! 
• Passenger: Ok. 
In order to deal with this example, we have used a simple knowledge base of 
information about trains, the speech acts defined in Section 6, and a library of 
domain actions needed to make inferences. The domain actions were adapted from 
[10] and the translation mechanism described in Section 4 was used. 
8.1.1. Domain Actions. As knowledge base, we have a collection of facts defin- 
ing the timetable for each train: 
timetable(Train, Place, ArrivingTime, DepartingTime, Gate). 
And some rules defining the clerk's beliefs: 
holds_at( bel ( c, r e f ( f r om( Place ) , train(X))), E) ~ (18) 
timetable(X, Place, O, DepartingTime, Gate). 
holds_at(bel(c, re f ( to( Place), train(X))), E) ~-- 
timetable(X, Place, ArrivingTime, O, Gate). (19) 
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holds_at ( bel (c, re f (depart (Time), train(X))), E) ~- 
timetable(X, Place, ArrivingTime, Time, Gate). (20) 
at(c, Place). 
holds_at( bel( c, re f ( arrive(Time), train(X))), E) ~-- 
timetable(X, Place, Time, DepartingTime, Gate). (21) 
at(c, Place). 
holds_at(hal(c, re f (gate( Gate), train(X))), E) +-- 
timetable(X, Place, ArrivingT ime, DepartingT ime, Gate). (22) 
Note that an arriving/departing time of 0 means that the place is the start- 
ing/ending point of that train. 
As an example, we could have the following knowledge base (we are assuming 
that the clerk is in Coimbra): 
timetable(a, Lisboa, O, 7:15, 4). (23) 
timetable(a, Coimbra, 8.'45, 8:50, 7). (24) 
timetable(a, Porto, 10_:15, 0, 3). (25) 
timetable(b, Porto, O, 7-20, 2). (26) 
timetable(b, Coimbra, 8.'50, 8:55, 5). (27) 
timetable(b, Lisboa, 10-20, 0, 2). (28) 
at(c, Coimbra). (29) 
As domain actions, we have defined the following actions: 
1. goto(agent, location) 
2. meet(agent, arriveTrain) 
3. board(agent, departTrain) 
4. take_train_trip (agent, departTrain, destination). 
These actions were described using the representation language defined in Sec- 
tion 4: 
goto( agent, location) causes at(agent, location). 
This expression means that if an agent goes to a specific place, then he will be at 
that place. 
The second action is defined by the expression 
meet(agent, train) if  at(agent, gate), at(train, gate). 
This expression means that if an agent is at a gate, he meets the train that is there. 
The third action is defined by 
board(agent, rain) causes at(agent, rain) 
if at(train, gate), at(agent, gate). 
This rule means that if an agent is at a departing train gate and boards on that 
train, then s/he will be in the train. 
The last action is defined by the expression 
take_train_trip(agent, departTrain, destination) if has_ticket(agent), 
at(agent, departTrain). 
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This rules means that an agent takes a train trip if he has a ticket and he is in the 
departing train. 
8.1.2. Generic Rules. Two generic rules that connect he speech acts and the 
domain actions were also defined. 
The first rule states 
informref(C, P, T, train(X)) i f  bel(C, int(C, informref(C, P, T, train(X)))), 
bel( C, re f (T, train(X))), 
not bel( C, bel( P, re f (T, train(X)))), 
bel(C, bel(P, ref(T1, train(X)))), T1 ~ T. 
This expression states that if a clerk C intends to inform a passenger P about a 
known specific property T of a train X, and if s/he believes that the passenger does 
not know that property (but knows a different property), then the clerk can perform 
the inform action. Note that with this rule, the clerk only informs passengers about 
trains that they already know something about (destination, time, ...). 
This expression is translated into the rule 
succeeds(E) ~-- act( E, in f ormre f ( C, P, T, train( X) ) ), 
holds_at(bel(C, int(C, in f ormre f(C, P, T, train(X)))), E), 
holds_at(bel( C, re f (T, train(X))), E), (30) 
not holds_at ( bel ( C, bel ( P, r e f ( T, train(X)))), E ) , 
holds_at(bel( C, bel ( P, re f ( T1, train(X)))), E), TI ! = T. 
The second rule states 
bel(C, bel(P, ref(depart(T),train(X)))) i f  bel(C, bel(P, ref(time(T), 
train(X)))), 
not bel( C, bel( P, re f (arrive(T), 
train(X)))). 
This expression states that a clerk may infer that a mentioned time is a departing 
time (if there is no evidence to believe it is an arriving time). 
This expression is translated into the rule 
holds_at(bel( C, bel( P, re f ( depart(T), train(X)))), E) ~-- 
holds_at(belie, bel( P, re f ( time(T), train(X)))), E), (31) 
not holds_at(bel( C, bel( P, re f (arrive( T), train(X)))), E). 
8.1.3. Inference Process. The first user utterance 
• Passenger: The eight-fifty train? 
creates the following facts: 
happens(el). 
act(el, request(p, c in f ormre f ( c, p, P, train(X)))). 
act(el, inform(p, c, re f (time( 8 : 50), train(X)))). 
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describing that the passenger requested to be informed by the clerk about a given 
reference of a train and that s/he knows the time of that train. Note that, in this 
example, we are assuming that the clerk is only concerned with trains. 
Moreover, in this paper, we are not dealing with the transformation process 
between the natural anguage sentences and our framework. 
If we pose the question about what are the clerk beliefs: 
holds_at(bel( C, X), el) (32) 
the answer will be (using rule 1 and the request rule 15): 
X = bel(p, int(p, informref(c, p, P, train(T)))). (33) 
This means that the clerk believes that the passenger wants to be informed about 
a specific property of a train. In order to infer this belief, it was necessary to 
abduce an event e0 < el that initiated the preconditions of the request rule (the 
passenger believes that the clerk can inform him about the reference of the train 
and, moreover, the passenger wants to request the clerk to do the inforrnerefaction). 
Using rule 16 for cooperativeness, the previous fact, and abducing an event that 
initiates the fluent that the clerk can perform the action, we will have 
X = int(c, informref(c, p, P, train(T)))) (34) 
meaning that the clerk intends to perform the action. 
On the other hand, using the second fact and the rule for the inform action (11), 
we will have 
X = bel(p, ref(time(8: 50), train(X))) (35) 
meaning that the clerk believes that the passenger in interested in an 8:50 train. 
Using rule 31: 
X = bel(p, ref(depart(8: 50), train(X))) (36) 
meaning that the clerk believes that the passenger is interested in a train departing 
at 8:50 (there is no evidence to support hat it is an arriving train). 
Taking these beliefs into account, it is possible to plan the clerk's actions. In 
fact, the clerk has beliefs about the passenger intentions and has his own intentions 
to fulfill. One possible action would be to inform the passenger about the train 
gate (using rule 19, 22, 24, 25, and 30): 
in f ormre f (c, p, re f ( to(porto), train(X))) (37) 
in f ormre f (c, p, re f (gate( 7 ), train(X))). 
Note that the clerk could inform the passenger about another unknown property 
(we have assumed an order of priorities between the properties). 
On the other hand, if in the sequence of the dialogue the passenger clarifies the 
term 8:50 as an arriving time, it is possible to perform the same kind of inference 
and to perform an informref about the train arriving at 8:50 (as in the dialogue). 
In this work, we are not dealing with the natural language generation of the 
different speech acts. 
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8. 2. Computer Mail Messages 
In the following example (adapted from [14], the user plan is detected to be incorrect 
in order to achieve the stated goal. 
• Q: I want to talk to Kathy. Do you know the phone number at the hospital? 
• A: She has already been discharged. Her home number is 555-8321. 
It was necessary to define two domain basic rules that state some common sense 
reasoning: 
bel(X, bel(A, by(call(A, L), talk(A, P), at(L, P)))) i f  bel(Z, int(A, talk(A, P))) 
bel(X, exp(A, at(L, P))). 
This rule means that if an agent believes that another agent intends to talk to 
someone that s/he expects to be at a specific place, then the agent believes that 
the other agent believes that by calling to that place s/he will talk to the person 
s/he is looking for. The rule is translated into 
holds_at(bel( X, bel( A, by(call(A, L ), talk(A, P), at(L, P)))), E) ~-- 
holds_at(bel( X, int( A, talk(A, P) ) ), E), (38) 
holds_at(bel( X, exp( A, at(L, P) ) ), E). 
The second rule states that 
bel( A, int( B, in f ormre f ( A, B, 
phone_number(N), L )) i f  bel(A, int(B, talk(B, P))) 
bel( A, exp( B, at(L, P) ) ), 
-~bel( A, know(B, phone(N, L ) ) ). 
This rule means that an agent A believes the other agent B wants to be informed 
about the phone number N of specific place L if the agent A believes that the other 
agent intends to talk to a person that he expects to be at the place L. Moreover, 
A believes that B does not know the correct phone number. The rule is translated 
into 
holds_at(bel( A, int( B, in f ormre f ( A, B, phone_number(N), L  )), E) ~- 
holds_at(bel( A, int( B, talk(B, P) ) ), E), 
hol ds_at (bel ( A, exp( B, at(L, P))), E), (39) 
-,holds_at(bel( A,know(B, phone_number(N, L ) ) ), E). 
In the first example, the user question might create the following facts: 
happens( eO ), 
act(eO, inform(user, system, int(user, talk(user, kathy)))), 
happens(el), e0 < el, (40) 
act(el, request(user, system, in f ormre f ( system, user, 
phone_number(N), hospital))) 
If we pose the question about the system's beliefs: 
holds_at ( bel (system, X ) , e 1 ) 
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using rule 1, the inform rule 10, and action e0, we will have 
X -- bel(user, int(user, talk(user, kathy))) 
and using rule 17: 
X = int(user, talk(user, kathy)). 
This means that the system believes that the user wants to talk to Kathy. 
On the other hand, using the request rule 15 and the action el, we will have 
X = bel(user, int(user, informref(system, user, phone_number(N), hospital))) 
meaning that the system believes the user believes that he wants to be informed 
by the system about the phone number of the hospital. 
Using rule 17: 
X = int(user, informref(system, user, phone_number(N), hospital)) 
meaning that the system believes the user wants to be informed by the system 
about the phone number of the hospital. 
With this fact and abducing an event that initiates the preconditions of rule 39 
(the fluents bel(system, exp(user, at(hospital, kathy))) and ~ bel(system, know 
(user, phone_number(N), hospital))), we will have (using rule 38). 
X = bel(user, by(call(user, hospital), talk(user, kathy), at(hospital, kathy))). 
The system believes that the user's belief by calling to the hospital is to talk to 
Kathy (assuming she is at the hospital). 
On the other hand, if the system already knows that Kathy is at home: 
initiates(e, exp( system, at(home, kathy))), e < el 
then the belief that by calling to the hospital we will talk to Kathy is incorrect (from 
the system's point of view), and it is possible to detect hat the user's expectation 
(at (hospital, kathy)) is different from the system's belief (at(home, kathy)). Taking 
these facts into account, it is possible to plan the system's next actions. 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have presented in this paper a framework that supports the abductive inference 
of actions and events through the use of extended logic programs and the event 
calculus. The framework allows to model a large class of cooperative information- 
seeking dialogues using a very general approach. In fact, the results obtained 
show that this framework is able to handle some of the classical problems that 
arise in dialogues (nonspecified goals, clarification subdialogues, error situations, 
misunderstandings). 
This work has some connections with the work of D. Appelt and M. Pollack [2] 
using weighted abduction for plan ascription. In our work, we have the abductive 
reasoning integrated in a general nonmonotonic logic programming framework [13]. 
Moreover, we are using Event Calculus, and we have also connected the epistemic 
operators with a speech acts theory. In our approach, we describe the speech acts 
I 
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and the epistemic operators in terms of the A-language [7], and then we will apply 
a general transformation i to abductive logic programs. 
However, it is an open problem to prove the correctness of the abductive vent 
calculus wrt the well founded semantics, and similarly, we have not proved the 
correctness of the transformations from the A-language into the event calculus 
logic programs. 
Another open problem is related to the complexity of the system. In fact, the 
framework relies on algorithms that are very complex (for instance, finding the 
revision sets), and that complexity can cause computational problems if we are 
dealing with larger logic programs. 
As future work, and in order to handle a larger class of problems, the framework 
should be incorporated in a more general natural anguage processing system such as 
the one described by Lopes and Quaresma [11, 15] where a multiheaded architecture 
coordinates several independent modules with the shared objective of supporting a
robust natural language interaction. 
We would like to thank the referees for their comments. 
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